We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, ε-Nash, subgame perfect, ε-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental approaches: one requires strong topological restrictions on the games, but produces very strong existence results. The other merely requires some very basic determinacy properties to still obtain some existence results. Both results are transfer results: starting with the existence of some equilibria for a small class of games, they allow us to conclude the existence of some type of equilibria for a larger class.
Introduction
The present article continues the research programme to investigate sequential games in a very general setting, which was initiated by the first author in [18, 19] . It extends the conference paper [21] . This programme reunites two mostly separate developments in the study of games. On the one hand, the first development is the investigation of variations on solution concepts for games, and of different formalizations of the preferences of the players, which primarily happened inside game theory proper. Related to that, game theory has also seen an interest in relaxing the continuity and convexity assumptions of Nash's original existence theorem [28] . Both for an example and references to further work see [29] . So typically, the countably infinite is absent from game theory: sets are either finite, or in cases such as randomized strategies, have the structure of the continuum.
On the other hand, the study of infinite sequential games has a long history in logic. Many variations on the rules of games have been studied, albeit mostly restricted to zero-sum games with two players and two outcomes. Thus, here the continuum is entirely absent (disregarding its internal occurrence in the set of potential plays), and the countably infinite is only used for time, not for e.g. the number of agents or outcomes.
In our work we study infinite sequential games with perfect information (i.e. generalized GaleStewart games [10] ) in a setting as general as possible. We can have any countable number of players, and we investigate various ways to represent preferences. Some results do put restrictions on the number of distinguished outcomes (as being countable), and some require a (generalized) zero-sum condition. A similar synthesis of the approaches is found in [41, 11, 8, 35] .
A classical result by Martin [25] established that such a game played by two players who only care about whether or not the play falls into some fixed Borel set is determined, i.e. admits a winning strategy for one of the players. While determinacy can be understood as a special case of existence of Nash equilibrium, Nash equilibrium is often regarded as an unsatisfactory solution concept for sequential games in game theory. Subgame perfect equilibria are a more convincing solution concept from a rationality perspective. This article studies these two concepts, and as best responses are not always available, we also investigate the existence of ε-Nash equilibria and ε-subgame perfect equilibria. Furthermore, we also study Pareto-optimal equilibria.
The proofs that we provide fall into two broad categories: some of our results are obtained by lifting Borel determinacy to more complicated settings, similar to [18, 19] or to a sketched observation by Mertens and Neyman in [27] . Other results are based on topological arguments to show strong existence results, albeit at the cost of continuity requirements in the game characterizations. Both proof techniques provide general results in rather abstract settings. In this sense, our main results are Theorem 7 on the one hand, and Theorems 22, 23, 25 (which share parts of their proofs) on the other hand.
A common theme of the results is that they are transfer principles: they tell us how to take a pre-existing result on a more restricted class of games and obtain from it a result for a more general class of games. Theorem 7 is then used to transfer the existence of subgame perfect equilibria from finite sequential games to certain infinite ones. With Theorems 22, 23, 25, we can in particular extend Borel determinacy to yield equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome settings.
In an attempt to make the rather abstract results somewhat more accessible, we shall consider in addition the corollaries obtained in the situation where the goals of the players are to maximize real-valued payoff functions. Distinguishing properties here are continuity, upper or lower semicontinuity and Borel measurability. These settings have been studied before [9, 27, 35, 8] , and usually our corollaries improve upon known results by extending them from the case of finitely many players to the case of countably many players. An overview of past and new results is given in the table on Page 3.
Our results showcase which requirements are actually needed for which aspects of determinacy, and as such may contribute to the understanding of strategic behaviour in general.
Additionally, the emergence of quantitative objectives in addition to qualitative structure in traditional verification/synthesis games [2] , such as mean-payoff parity games [4, 3] , provides an area of applications for abstract theorems about the existence of equilibria. Existence results in such settings are usually not trivial, but are proven together with the introduction of the setting -thus we do not answer open questions, but are hopeful that our results may be useful in the future. Having results for countably many players is important for applications if multi-agent interactions in open systems are studied. In order to employ an equilibrium existence result for finitely many players, a bound on the number of agents involved in the interaction might need to be common knowledge from the beginning on. Our results on the other hand easily enable a setting where additional agents may join the interaction later on, and only the number of agents who have acted in the past is finite.
This article is an extended and improved version of [21] . two-player games and games with finitely many players in any situation we investigate. As we consider perfect information games only, any zero-sum game is understood to be a two-player game. The combination of semi-continuity and zero-sum would imply continuity, and is thus left out. For continuous payoff functions, we already see complete positive results without the zero-sum condition, and thus do not mention it explicitly either. Both Corollary 28 and Example 15 seem to be folklore results.
Background
In our most abstract definition, a game is a tuple A, (S a ) a∈A , (≺ a ) a∈A consisting of a nonempty set A of agents or players, for each agent a ∈ A a non-empty set S a of strategies, and for each agent a ∈ A a preference relation ≺ a ⊆ a∈A S a × a∈A S a . The generic setting suffices to introduce the notion of a Nash equilibrium: a strategy profile σ ∈ a∈A S a is called a Nash equilibrium, if for every agent a ∈ A and every strategy s a ∈ S a we find ¬ (σ ≺ a σ a →sa ), where σ a →sa is defined by σ a →sa (b) = σ(b) for b ∈ A\{a} and σ a →sa (a) = s a . In words, no agent prefers over a Nash equilibrium some other situation that only differs in her choice of strategy.
We will give additional structure to games in two primary ways: in Section 3 we add topologies to the strategy spaces, and then impose some topological constraints on both strategy spaces and preferences. Beyond that, we will consider games where strategy spaces and preferences are derived objects from more structured variants of games. One such variant is the infinite sequential game:
Definition 1 (Infinite sequential game, cf. [18, Definition 1.1] ). An infinite sequential game is an object A, C, d, O, v, (≺ a ) a∈A complying with the following.
1.
A is a non-empty set (of agents).
2. C is a non-empty set (of choices).
3. d : C * → A (assigns a decision maker to each stage of the game).
4.
O is a non-empty set (of possible outcomes of the game).
5
. v : C ω → O (assigns outcomes to infinite sequences of choices).
6. Each ≺ a is a binary relation over O (modeling the preference of agent a).
The intuition behind the definition is that agents take turns to make a choice. Whose turn it is depends on the past choices via the function d. Over time, the agents thus jointly generate some infinite sequence, which is mapped by v to the outcome of the game. Note that using a single set of actions C for each step just simplifies the notation, a generalization to varying action sets is straightforward.
The infinite sequential games can be seen as abstract games: the agents remain the agents and the strategies of agent a are the functions s a : d −1 ({a}) → C. We can then safely regard a strategy profile as a function σ : C * → C whose induced play is defined below, where for an infinite sequence p ∈ C ω we let p n be its n-th value, and p ≤n = p <n+1 ∈ C * be its finite prefix of length n.
Definition 2 (Induced play and outcome, cf. [18, Definition 1.3]). Let s : C * → C be a strategy profile. The play p = p γ (s) ∈ C ω induced by s starting at γ ∈ C * is defined inductively through its prefixes: p n = γ n for n ≤ |γ| and p n := s(p <n ) for n > |γ|. Also, v • p γ (s) is the outcome induced by s starting at γ. The play (resp. outcome) induced by s is the play (resp. outcome) induced by s starting at ε.
In the usual way to regard an infinite sequential game as a special abstract game, an agent prefers a strategy profile σ to σ ′ , iff he prefers the outcome induced by σ to the outcome induced by σ ′ . And indeed we shall call a strategy profile of an infinite sequential game a Nash equilibrium, iff it is a Nash equilibrium with these preferences. In a certain notation overload, we will in particular use the same symbols for the preferences over strategy profiles and the preferences over outcomes.
However, there is a certain criticism of this choice as being not rational: essentially, the resulting concept of a Nash equilibrium means that players can use empty threats -declarations they would play in a certain way from a position onwards, even if that would be against their own interests once the position is reached, as long as this threat keeps other players from moving to that position. This can be fixed by considering subgame perfect equilibria [38] . We understand these as the Nash equilibria derived from a different translation of preferences from infinite sequential games to abstract games. (Similar remarks were made in [16, Lemma 144 
We consider a further variant, namely the infinite sequential games with real-valued payoffs, which can (but do not have to) be understood as a special case of infinite sequential games. Such a game can be identified with the infinite sequential game A, C, d, R A , v, (≺ a ) a∈A where v(p) = (f a (p)) a∈A and for x, y ∈ R A , we set x ≺ a y iff x a < y a .
As with the introduction of subgame perfect equilibria, we can consider infinite sequential games with real-valued payoffs as infinite sequential games in a different way, which then gives rise to another commonly studied equilibrium concept, namely ε-Nash equilibria. Depending on how we then translate from infinite sequential games to abstract games, we obtain also ε-subgame perfect equilibria. Given some ε > 0, we define the relation ≺ ε a ⊆ R A × R A by x ≺ ε a y iff y a − x a > ε. Using ≺ ε a in place of ≺ a in Definition 4 then provides the above-mentioned equilibrium notions.
For infinite sequential games with real-valued payoffs, every Nash equilibrium (w.r.t. the standard preferences) is an ε-Nash equilibrium; and every subgame perfect equilibrium is an ε-subgame perfect equilibrium. For infinite sequential games, every subgame perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, in particular, any ε-subgame perfect equilibrium is an ε-Nash equilibrium.
We use antagonistic game to refer to two-player games with preferences satisfying
We proceed to recall a few more notions that are only tangentially related to the formulation of our results, but that do show up in the proofs. Finally, we will extend the notion of the induced play. Given some partial function s :⊆ C * → C, we define the consistency set P (s) ⊆ C ω by:
Pareto-optimality
Pareto-optimality provides a notion of social desirability in game theory, and can be used both to pick particularly nice equilibria, and to investigate whether the strategic interaction is costly in some sense 2 . The fundamental idea is that a Pareto-optimal outcome cannot be improved to everyone's satisfaction. Pareto-optimality is often only defined for linear preferences (or, slightly more general, strict weak orders), and its extension to general preferences is not obvious. The two natural choices are:
Definition 6. An outcome is realizable in some game, if it is assigned to some sequence of choices. We call an outcome o Pareto-optimal, if there is no other realizable outcome q such that for some player a we find o ≺ a q and for no player b we have q ≺ a o. We call an outcome o weakly Pareto-optimal, if there is no other realizable outcome q such that for some player a we find o ≺ a q and for all players b we have that o b q.
Note that for linear preferences, both notions coincide. We shall call a Nash equilibrium (weakly) Pareto-optimal iff it induces a (weakly) Pareto-optimal outcome.
The continuity argument
A strong transfer result can be obtained using topological arguments alone, with the reasoning being particularly well-adapted to a formulation in synthetic topology (originally [6] , [32] for a short introduction). Consider games in normal form, with potentially countably many agents with strategy spaces S 1 , S 2 , . . .. Our first condition is that each S i be compact (subsequently, by Tychonoff's Theorem, also Π i∈N S i ). This restriction is very common and usually combined with continuity of the outcome function, as it avoids pathological games such as pick-the-largestnatural-number. Our second condition is that each preference relation ≺ i is open (as a subset of (Π i∈N S i ) × (Π i∈N S i )). 3 In the reading of synthetic topology, this means that any agent will be able to eventually confirm that he prefers a given strategy profile to another, provided he does indeed do so. We shall call a class of games G satisfying these conditions (in a uniform way) to be compact-strategies, open-preferences. Uniformity here means that we assume a topology on G such that the function mapping a game to the preferences is continuous itself.
We will write O(X) for the hyperspace of open subsets of X, and K(X) for the hyperspace of compact sets. By C(X, Y) we denote the space of continuous functions from X to Y, in particular C(N, X) we denote the space of sequences in X. For precise definitions, see [32] . There we also find that the following operations are continuous:
2 Similar to the (quantitative) price of stability, see [36] . 3 There actually is a third condition, that any strategy space is overt. A space X is overt, if {∅} ⊆ O(X) is a closed set, i.e. if there is a way to detect non-emptiness of open subsets. This condition could only ever fail in a constructive reading, but is always valid for topological spaces in classical logic. Synthetic topology however would also allow us to read continuous map to mean computable map, in which case overtness becomes non-trivial. In this reading, though, we actually obtain an algorithmic result. 4 In general, the continuity of this map would require Y to be overt. As explained above, in a classical reading, this condition is always satisfied.
Theorem 7. Let G be compact-strategies, open-preferences, and let G ′ ⊆ G be a dense subclass. If every G ∈ G ′ has a Nash equilibrium, then every G ∈ G has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By combining our continuous operations, we may obtain the set of all games in G with a Nash equilibrium as an open set in the following way:
Formulating the individual steps in words: with ≺ i being open 5 , we immediately obtain that the set of all strategy profiles such that player i has a better response is uniformly open in the game. Taking the union over all players again yields an open set, which complement now is the closed set NE(G) of all Nash equilibria of the respective game G. As this is a subset of the compact space (Π i∈N S i ), we can even treat NE(G) as a compact set uniformly in G. By the synthetic definition of compactness, we obtain that {G ∈ G | NE(G) = ∅} ⊆ G is an open set. Because we have assumed G ′ to be dense in G, we see that if any game in G would fail to have a Nash equilibrium, this would imply that some game in G ′ would fail, too, contrary to the assumption.
Lemma 8. Consider sequential games with continuous payoff-functions and finite choices sets. We find:
1. The subgame-perfect preferences produce a compact-strategies, open-preference class S.
2. The games with payoffs fully determined after finitely many moves are a dense subset S f ⊆ S.
3. All games in S f have a Nash equilibrium.
Proof.
} is an open set. By taking countable union, we learn that ≺ sgp a is open. Compactness and overtness of the strategy spaces are straightforward. (1) is uniform in the continuous functions f a , it suffices to argue that the payoff functions f : C ω → R depending only on some finite prefix of the input are dense in C(C ω , R). A countable base for the applicable topology is found in all
As the argument in
A base element is non-empty, iff ∀γ ∈ C k x γ < y γ ; and then it will contain the function
x p ≤k + y p ≤k , which clearly depends only on the prefix of length k of its argument.
3. As the actions of the players beyond the finite prefix determining the outputs is irrelevant, and taking into consideration the definition of the subgame-perfect preferences, the claim is that any finite game in extensive form has a subgame perfect equilibrium. This wellknown result (Kuhn [15] ) is easily proven by backwards induction: let the players who move last pick an optimal (for them) choice. Then the players who move second-but-last have guaranteed outcomes associated with their moves, so they can optimize, and so on.
Corollary 9 (( 6 )). Any sequential game with continuous payoff functions and finitely many choices has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
We shall consider a number of variations/extensions. First, we investigate stochastic 7 infinite sequential games with continuous payoff functions as a variation of Definition 4: a stochastic infinite sequential game with real-valued payoffs is a tuple A, C, d, (f a ) a∈N , P where A, C, f a are as above, n / ∈ A, d : C * → A ∪ {n} and P assigns a probability distribution over C to each
The notion of the play induced by a strategy profile is replaced by a probability distribution over plays induced by a strategy profile: essentially, we choose according to the strategy profile in vertices controlled by a player, and stochastically according to P (w) in vertices controlled by n (nature). A player prefers a strategy profile to another one if the expected value of his payoff function regarding the former induced probability distribution exceeds the expected value regarding the latter. We obtain a notion of a subgame perfect equilibrium as before.
Lemma 10. Consider stochastic infinite sequential games with continuous payoff-functions and finite choices sets. We find:
1. The subgame-perfect preferences produce a compact-strategies, open-preference class SS.
2. The games with payoffs fully determined after finitely many moves are a dense subset SS f ⊆ SS.
3. All games in SS f have a Nash equilibrium.
Proof.
1. For a synthetic approach to continuity on probability measures etc, see [5] . In particular, the map from strategy profiles to induced probability distributions is easily seen to be continuous; and integration is as well. The remaining argument proceeds as in Lemma 8 (1).
2. The stochastic vertices do not impact the argument, so it works as in Lemma 8 (2).
3. As in Lemma 8 (3), we use backwards inductions: the value of a given leaf for a player is immediately obtained from the payoff function. In any vertex controlled by a player, he picks a choice guaranteeing him the optimal value, and the value of that vertex for any player p is identical to the value of the corresponding child for p. The value of a nature vertex is the expected value of its children according to the probability distribution given by P . This is easily seen to yield a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Corollary 11. Stochastic infinite sequential games with continuous payoff-functions and finite choices sets have subgame-perfect equilibria.
In a similar fashion we can consider multi-player multi-outcome Blackwell games [1, 26] with continuous payoff functions (into [0, 1]). In a Blackwell game, in each round a finite subset A v of m players act jointly and probabilistic and thus determine the next vertex in the tree. In particular, we are now dealing with a tree with branching C m instead of just C. The map d indicating who plays now goes into the m-element subsets of A rather than identifying just a single player. Strategies are functions s a :⊆ (C m ) * → P (C), where P (C) shall denote the set of probability distributions over C, strategy profiles are of the form s :⊆ A × (C m ) * → P (C m ) and payoff functions go f a : (C m ) ω → [0, 1]. Each strategy profile induces a probability distribution over (C m ) ω (also from a given vertex onwards), payoffs for players are then again the expected values of their payoff functions given the induced probability distribution.
Lemma 12. Consider Blackwell games with continuous payoff-functions, countably many agents and a finite choice set. We find:
1. The subgame-perfect preferences produce a compact-strategies, open-preference class B.
2. The games with payoffs fully determined after finitely many moves (and thus depending only on the choices made by finitely many players) are a dense subset B f ⊆ B.
3. All games in B f have a Nash equilibrium.
1. Very much like Lemma 10 (1). The induced probability distribution depends continuously on the strategy profile, and the expected value is a continuous map. It is unproblematic that C is replaced by P(C) now, as this space is still compact.
As in Lemma 8 (2), we only need to argue that the continuous payoff functions determined
by their values on (C m ) n for some n ∈ N are dense in
. This in turn follows just as before, taking into account the definition of the product topology.
3. We can ignore the players whose actions do not impact the payoff functions, and the moves in the game taking place after the payoffs have been determined. Thus we are dealing with a finite tree, and can use backwards induction again. The leaves of the finite tree are assigned payoff values from the payoff functions. The preceding layer of vertices now corresponds to usual normal form games (with finitely many players and finitely many choices), who have Nash equilibria by Nash' classic result [28] . Pick a Nash equilibrium for each such vertex, and assign it the corresponding outcomes as values. Then the layer preceding this one can be handled in the same way, etc. -so the claim follows by backwards induction.
Corollary 13 ( ( 8 )). Any multi-outcome Blackwell game with countably many players and continuous payoff functions has a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
The arguments for Lemma 12 remain unaffected if the number of agents playing at a particular vertex varies with the vertex (this just increases notational complexity). We can even let all players act at each time, as long as we then restrict their strategies to continuously depend on the choices (note that this would produce a tree with branching factor 2 ℵ 0 ). We can also turn one player into a designated nature player, which plays according to some prespecified strategy rather than according to preferences, and thus obtain: Corollary 14. Any multi-outcome stochastic Blackwell game with countably many players and continuous payoff functions has a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Concurrent games (in the sense of Winskel) may be another interesting class of games to apply this approach to. Determinacy questions of these games were discussed in [12, 13] .
Infinite sequential games with infinitely ascending preferences
As soon as the continuity requirement for the payoff function (or, more generally, the openness of the preferences) is dropped, Nash equilibria may fail to exist. We provide a generic folklore counterexample, and will proceed to demonstrate that the underlying feature is essential for the failure of existence of Nash equilibria. The counterexample only requires a single player, and its payoff function is in a sense the least discontinuous payoff function, and in particular is ∆ 0 2 -measurable. Example 15. Let the payoff function P : {0, 1} N → [0, 1] for the single player be defined by P (1 n 0p) = n n+1 for all p ∈ {0, 1} N and P (1 N ) = 0. As P does not attain its supremum, the resulting game cannot have a Nash equilibrium. We proceed to show in particular that the presence of a converging sequence of plays (p n ) n∈N such that a player prefers p n+1 to p n , but prefers any p n to lim i→∞ p i , is a crucial feature of the example above to have no Nash equilibrium. The proof will be an adaption of the main result of [18] by the first author. Under the additional assumption of antagonistic preferences in a two-player game, we can even obtain subgame perfect equilibria.
In this section the preferences of the players are restricted to strict weak orders, so we recall their definition below.
Definition 16 (Strict weak order). A relation
Definition 17 below slightly rephrases Definitions 2.3 and 2.5 from [18] : the guarantee of a player is the smallest set of outcomes that is upper-closed w.r.t. the strict-weak-order preference of the player and includes every incomparability classe (of the preference) that contains any outcome compatible with a given strategy of the player in the subgame at a given node of a given infinite sequential game. The best guarantee of a player consists of the intersection of all her guarantees over the set of strategies. ∀a ∈ A, ∀γ ∈ C * , ∀s :
We write g a (s) and G a instead of g a (γ, s) and G a (γ) when γ is the empty word. Lemma 2.4. from [18] still holds without major changes in the proofs, so we do not display it, but note that when speaking about ≺ a -terminal intervals (which are upper-closed sets), we now actually refer to the terminal intervals of the lift of ≺ a from outcomes to the equivalence classes of outcomes induced by the strict weak order. Also, we collect some more useful facts in Observation 18 below.
Observation 18. Let A, C, O, d, v, (≺ a ) a∈A , let a ∈ A, assume that ≺ a is a strict weak order, and let γ ∈ C * .
This section's proofs of existence of equilibrium rely on each player having a (minimax-style) optimal strategy if all other players team up against her. Lemma 19 below provides a sufficient condition for such strategies to exist, i.e. for the best guarantee to be witnessed.
Lemma 19.
Let A, C, O, d, v, (≺ a ) a∈A be a game where C is finite, let a ∈ A, and let us assume the following.
1. ≺ a is a strict weak order.
2. For every play p ∈ C ω , increasing ϕ : N → N, and sequence (s n ) n∈N of strategies for Player
Then for all γ ∈ C * there exists s ∈ S a such that g a (γ, s) = G a (γ).
Proof. Wlog we only prove that there exists s ∈ S a such that g a (s) = G a , i.e. where the γ from the claim is the empty word. Let s 0 : d −1 (a) → C be a strategy for Player a and let us build inductively a sequence (s n ) n∈N of strategies for Player a, as follows, where case 3. implicitly invokes Observation 18.
• Let s n+1 | C <n := s n | C <n .
• For all γ ∈ C n \d −1 (a), let s n+1 | γC * := s n | γC * .
• For all γ ∈ C n ∩ d −1 (a),
3. otherwise 9 let s n+1 (γ) := c such that G a (γ ·c) = G a (γ), and let s n+1 | γCC * := s n | γCC * .
Let s be the limit strategy of the sequence (s n ) n∈N and first note that, using Observation 18, one can prove by induction on γ that G a (γ) ⊆ G a for every γ ∈ C * that is compatible with s. Next, let p ∈ P (s) be a path compatible with s. If p has a prefix γ that fell into Cases 1. or 2. during the recursive construction above, then v(p) ∈ G a , so let us now assume that case 3. applies at every node p <n ∈ d −1 (a). If such nodes are finitely many, let p <n be the deepest one, so d(p n+1+k ) = a for all k ∈ N, and v(p) ∈ g a (p n+1 , t) for all strategies t for a, so
by Case 3. Let us now assume that such nodes are infinitely many. If G a (p <n ) G a for some p <n ∈ d −1 (a), there exists
by definition, which would mean that Case 1. or 2. applies; so G a (p <n ) = G a for all p <n ∈ d −1 (a), and subsequently for all n. Also, the best guarantee is never witnessed (through Case 2.) at any node p <n ∈ d −1 (a), and subsequently for all n. If v(p) / ∈ G a , the previous two remarks allow us to build inductively a sequence (t n ) n∈N of strategies for a such that v(p) / ∈ g a (p <0 , t 0 ) and g a (p <n+1 , t n+1 ) g a (p <n , t n ) for all n ∈ N, which would imply v(p) ∈ ∩ n∈N g a (p <n , t n ) by assumption of the lemma, contradiction.
More specifically, this section's proofs of existence of equilibrium rely on each player having a strategy that is (minimax-style) optimal for every subgame at once. Lemma 20 below gives a sufficient condition for such strategies to exists. It relies on Condition 3, which is also the conclusion in Lemma 19, to perform a key quantifier inversion. Note that Condition 2 in Lemma 20 is weaker than that in Lemma 19 , and that finiteness of C is used in Lemma 19 only. It is the main reason why Lemmas 19 and 20 are not merged.
Lemma 20. Let A, C, O, d, v, (≺ a ) a∈A be a game, let a ∈ A, and let us assume the following.
For every play p ∈ C ω and increasing
3. For all γ ∈ C * there exists s ∈ S a such that g a (γ, s) = G a (γ).
Then there exists s such that g a (γ, s) = G a (γ) for all γ ∈ C * .
Proof. We proceed similarly as in the proof of Lemma 19. Let s 0 be a strategy for Player a and let us build inductively a sequence (s n ) n∈N of strategies for Player a. The recursive definition below is different from the one in the proof of Lemma 19 in three respects: the three occurrences of G a in Cases 1. and 2. are replaced with G a (γ). Case 3. is deleted since it never applies by assumption. Finally, two inclusions are replaced with equalities.
• Let
Let s be the limit strategy of the sequence (s n ) n∈N and first note that, using Observation 18, one can prove by induction on γ that G a (γ) ⊆ G a for every γ ∈ C * that is compatible with s. Next, let p ∈ P (s) be a path compatible with s. Due to the uniformity of the recursive definition, it suffices to show that v(p) ∈ G a to prove the full statement.
If Case 2. applies only finitely many times in the construction of s, the sequence (s n | {γ∈C * | p∈γC ω } ) n∈N is eventually constant, so v(p) ∈ g a (p <n , s n ) = G a (p <n ) ⊆ G a for some n. Otherwise, there exists an increasing function ϕ : N → N with d (p <ϕ(n) ) = a and G a (p <ϕ(n+1) 
Theorems 22 and 23 below both prove the existence of subgame perfect equilibria for antagonistic games, either when the choice set C is finite, or when the outcome set O is finite. Since their proofs are similar, most is factored out in Lemma 21 below.
Lemma 21. Let {a, b}, C, O, d, v, {≺, ≺ −1 } be a two-player game. Let Γ ⊆ P(C ω ) and assume the following.
1. ≺ is a strict weak order.
2. For every play p ∈ C ω and increasing sequence ϕ :
4. For all non-empty closed E ⊆ C ω , there are ≺-extremal elements in v[E].
For every ≺-extremal interval I and γ
Then the game {a, b}, C, O, d, v, {≺, ≺ −1 } has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. By invoking Lemma 20 once for Player a and once for Player b, let us build a strategy profile s : C * → C, such that g X (γ, s X ) = G X (γ) for all γ ∈ C * and X ∈ {a, b}. Let γ ∈ C * and let us prove that
Consider the game C, D, W (as in Definition 5) where the winning set is defined by W := {α ∈ γC ω | v(α) ∈ G a (γ)\{min < (G a (γ))}} and where Player a owns exactly the nodes in D := (C * \ γC * ) ∪ (d −1 ({a}) ∩ γC * ). By Assumption 5 the set W is in Γ, so by Assumption 6 the game C, D, W is determined. By definition of the best guarantee, Player a has no winning strategy for this game, so Player b has a winning strategy, which means that
Since G a (γ)∩G b (γ) must be non-empty, otherwise the two guarantees are contradictory,
This means that the subprofile of s rooted at γ induces the outcome min < (G a (γ)) (which equals max < (G b (γ)) by symmetry), and it is optimal for both players. Proof. From Theorem 23, quasi-Borel determinacy [26] , and Lemma 3.1. in [18] .
In the remainder of this section we discuss existence of Nash equilibria in multi-player games. Theorem 25 below is our most general result. Theorem 25. Let A, C, O, d, v, (≺ a ) a∈A be a game, let Γ ⊆ P(C ω ), and assume the following.
1. The ≺ a are strict weak orders.
2. The game C, D, W is determined for all W ∈ Γ, D ⊆ C * .
3. For every a ∈ A and ≺ a -terminal interval I and γ ∈ C * , we have
4. For every play p ∈ C ω and increasing sequence ϕ :
5. For all γ ∈ C ω , there exists s such that g a (γ, s) = G a (γ). Then the game A, C, O, d, v, (≺ a ) a∈A has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.9 in [18] , we rephrase and give it a more intuitive flavour. Let σ be a strategy profile where every player is using a witness to Lemma 20. Let p be the induced play. We now turn σ into a Nash equilibrium with p as induced play by use of threats. More specifically, at each node p <n we let the players other than a := d(p <n ) threaten Player a that if she deviates from p exactly at p <n , they will team up against her at every subsequent position γ after p <n other than those extending the prescribed p <n+1 .
We claim that if they team up, they can prevent Player a from getting better outcome than v(p) by deviating to γ, which will suffice. Let us build a win-lose game C, D, W , with Player a against her threatening opponents gathered as a meta-player, and where the winning set for Player a is defined by
. This game is determined by Assumptions 2 and 3, and Player a looses it, otherwise her winning strategy would guarantee that v(p) / ∈ G a (p <n ) and thus contradict the choice of p. Therefore the threat of the opponents of Player a is effective.
Theorem 26 below is a simpler version of Theorem 25 that does only involve primitive notions from the definition of a game. Especially, it does not refer to the notion of guarantee. Via a necessary and sufficient condition, it shows how essential the feature of Example 15 is for the existence of Nash equilibrium. Let g be a A, C, O, d, v, (≺ a ) a∈A be a game where the ≺ a are strict weak orders and v is Borel-measurable. The following are equivalent.
Theorem 26.
1. For every X ∈ A and (p n ) n∈N sequence of plays in C ω converging to some p, and increasing
2. Every finite-branching game derived from the original game by pruning has an NE.
Proof. Let us first prove 1. ⇒ 2. by invoking Theorem 25. More specifically, let T be a finitebranching, infinite subtree of C ω and consider the restriction of the original game to T . Conditions 3 and 2 follow from Borel measurability and [25] . Condition 5 comes from Lemma 19 (actually a straightforward extension of Lemma 19 to trees with finite-yet-unbounded branching), and Condition 4 follows directly from the assumption.
For 2. ⇒ 1., let X ∈ {a, b} and let (p n ) n∈N → p ∈ C ω and increasing ϕ :
). Let T be the tree made of the prefixes of p and the p n . Since the game induced by T has an NE and its tree structure is similar to Example 15, v 
However, the modification of Example 15 below shows that the conditions of Theorem 26 are not necessary for the mere existence of Nash equilibria. a 2 a 2 3 a n n+1 0 For further comparison, the preparatory work before [18, Theorem 2.9] considers strict wellorders only; then [18, Theorem 2.9] considers strict well-founded orders, since linear extensions of these make it possible to invoke the special, linear case, knowing that any Nash equilibrium for these extensions is still a Nash equilibrium for the original preferences. However, let us explain why Theorem 25 assumes that preferences are strict weak orders, instead of more general strict partial orders. In the preparatory work before both results, the algorithm that builds a play step by step makes decisions based on the guarantees that the subgames offer. If the guarantees of one player were not ordered by a strict weak order, the player might eventually regret a previous decision, in the same way that backward induction on partially ordered preferences may not yield a Nash equilibrium (see e.g., [14] for a concrete example or page 3 of [17] for a generic one). So the algorithm has to run on strict weak orders. (In [18, Theorem 2.9] it even runs on strict linear orders.)
If we wanted to consider strict partial orders and extend them linearly for the algorithm to work, we would potentially run into two problems: first, there may not exist any linear extension preserving Condition 4. Second, assumptions 2 and 3 of Theorem 25 make sure that the win-lose games associated with the ≺ a -terminal intervals are determined, which is a requirement for the proof to work. If the preferences were not strict weak orders, we might think of replacing the condition on terminal intervals by a condition on the upper-closed sets and then extend the preferences linearly for the algorithm to work, but in the special case where the preference of one player were the empty relation, every subset would be an upper-closed set and its preimage by v would be in the pointclass with nice closure property, by assumption. If, in addition, each outcome is mapped to at most one play, it implies that each subset of C ω is in the pointclass, so Theorem 25 could be used with the axiom of determinacy only, but not with, e.g., Borel determinacy. On the contrary, [18, Theorem 2.9, Assumption 3] is not an issue since there are only countably many outcomes in that setting.
Theorem 25 has a corollary pertaining to sequential games with real-valued payoffs. Rather than the usual Euclidean topology, we consider the lower topology generated by {(−∞, a) | a ∈ Q}. This space will be denoted by R > . Note that continuous functions with codomain R > are often called upper semi-continuous. As id : R > → R is complete for the Σ 0 2 -measurable functions [42, 40] , we see that the Borel sets 10 on R > are the same as the Borel sets on R. Moreover, if (p n ) n∈N is a converging sequence of plays, and P : {0, 1} N → R > is a continuous payoff function, then P (lim i∈N p i ) ≥ lim sup i∈N P (p i ). In particular, Condition 4 in Theorem 25 is always satisfied for the preferences obtained from upper semi-continuous payoff functions. 
Then any v ǫ is again a Borel measurable valuation (as a product of countably many intervals is Π 0 2 ). Furthermore, we define the preferences ≺ n for the n-th player by (i k ) k∈N ≺ n (j k ) k∈N iff i n < j n . Now every Nash equilibrium of the resulting game is a ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the original game, and every subgame perfect equilibrium of the resulting game is a ǫ-subgame perfect equilibrium of the original game.
Corollary 28. 11 Sequential games with countably many players and Borel-measurable payoff functions with upper-bounds admit ε-Nash equilibria.
Proof. By combining the statement of Theorem 26 with the argument above. We can invoke Theorem 26 as the preferences ≺ n do not have any infinite ascending chains at all.
Corollary 29.
A sequential two-player zero-sum game with Borel measurable payoffs has ε-subgame perfect equilibria.
Proof. By Corollary 24 and the argument above. 10 As R> is not metric (but still countably based), the definition of the Borel hierarchy has to be modified as demonstrated by Selivanov [37] . A move towards definitions of Borel measurability on even more general spaces can be found in [34] .
11 In his survey [27] , Mertens sketches an observation by himself and Neyman that one may use Borel determinacy to directly obtain the special case of this result for finitely many players and bounded payoffs.
On the existence of Pareto-optimal NE
In this section we investigate very general classes of games that guarantee existence of Nash equilibria, and such that there exists an NE that is Pareto-optimal among all the profiles of the game (not just Pareto-optimal among all Nash equilibria). In the following, we shall assume that any outcome is realizable to avoid unnecessary case-distinctions.
Lemma 30. Let Γ be a determined pointclass. Then every infinite sequential two-player game with a Γ-measurable outcome function and preferences y ≺ a x 1 ≺ a . . . ≺ a x n and y ≺ b x n ≺ b . . . ≺ b x 1 , has a Pareto-optimal NE.
Proof. By assumption that every outcome is realizable, there is some path p through the game yielding a payoff that is not y. For each vertex along this path, by determinacy either the opponent can enforce the outcome y, or the controller can enforce some upper interval. As long as the opponent can enforce y, he can force the controller to play along the chosen path by threaten punishment by y for deviation. If we ever reach a vertex where the controller (w.l.o.g. a) can enforce {x 1 , . . . , x n }, there will be some minimal upper set {x i , . . . , x n } (from her perspective) that she can enforce. By determinacy, again, the opponent can enforce {y, x 1 , . . . , x i }. We then let both players play their enforcing strategy from this node onwards.
The constructed partial strategies can be extended in an arbitrary way to yield a Nash equilibrium with another outcome than y, and these are all Pareto-optimal.
Theorem 31. We fix a non-empty set of players A and a non-empty set of outcomes O. Let Γ be a determined pointclass closed under rescaling and union with clopens. Then the following are equivalent for a family (≺ a ) a∈A of linear preferences:
1. The inverse of the preferences are well-founded and ∀a, b ∈ A, ∀x, y, z
2. Every finite sequential game (built from A, O, (≺ a ) a∈A ) with three leaves has a Paretooptimal NE.
3. Every infinite sequential game (built from A, O, (≺ a ) a∈A ) with a Γ-measurable outcome function has a Pareto-optimal NE.
Proof. 3. ⇒ 2. Clear.
2. ⇒ 1. By contraposition, let us assume that z ≺ a y ≺ a x and x ≺ b z ≺ b y, and note that the game below has only one NE yielding outcome z. implies that there exists a partition {O i } i∈I of O and a linear order < over I such that i < j implies x < a y for all a ∈ A and x ∈ O i and y ∈ O j , and such that
for all a, b ∈ A. By the well-foundedness assumption, I has a <-maximum m. Fix some a ∈ A, let {x 1 , . . . , x n } := O m (again, by well-foundedness, each slice is finite) such that x n < a · · · < a x 1 , let A 0 := {b ∈ A| < b | Om =< a | Om }, let A 1 := A\A 0 , and let y / ∈ O m . Let us derive a new game on the same tree: each vertex of the original game owned by b ∈ A is now owned by A 0 if b ∈ A 0 and by A 1 otherwise. Each play of the original game that induces an outcome outside of O m induces y in the derived game. The new preferences are y < A 0 x n < A 0 · · · < A 0 x 1 and y < A 1 x 1 < A 1 · · · < A 1 x n . By Lemma 30, the derived game has a Pareto-optimal NE (which cannot yield y, as this is the only non-Pareto-optimal outcome). It is also a Pareto-optimal NE for the original game.
The situation for non-linear orders is less clear. Certainly, whenever some linearization avoids the forbidden pattern from Theorem 31 (1.), there will be a Pareto-optimal NE (as being Pareto-optimal w.r.t. the linearization implies being Pareto-optimal w.r.t. the original preferences). However, we do not know whether partial preferences such that any linearization has the forbidden pattern is enough to enable absence of Pareto-optimal NE. Two examples that could potentially play a similar role to the generic counterexample in Theorem 31 (2. → 1.) follow:
Example 32. We consider a finite two-player game with outcomes {x, y, z, α, β, γ}, preferences γ ≺ a y ≺ a x and z ≺ a β ≺ a α and x ≺ b z ≺ b y and α ≺ b γ ≺ b β and game tree: b a x y α β z γ
The preferences avoid the forbidden pattern from Theorem 31 (1.); but the pattern is present in any linear extension. In the Nash equilibria of the game, player b is choosing either z or γ; and player a is choosing x or α. In particular, the potential equilibrium outcomes are z and γ -precisely those outcomes that are not weakly Pareto-optimal (because every player prefers y to z and β to γ). Both y and β would even have been Pareto-optimal.
Example 33. We consider a finite two-player game with outcomes {x, y, z, t}, preferences t, z ≺ a x, y and x ≺ b z ≺ b y ≺ b t and game tree: b
The preferences are strict weak orders and avoid the forbidden pattern from Theorem 31 (1.); but the pattern is present in any linear extension. The only equilibrium outcome is z, despite everyone preferring y ( 12 ).
Absence of subgame perfect equilibria
In this section we will show that in the simultaneous absence of continuity and the antagonistic/zerosum property, even a two-player game with three distinct outcomes may fail to have subgame perfect equilibria. It is a straightforward consequence that moving to ε-subgame perfect equilibria cannot help, either. As our (counter-) Example 15, the valuation function here is ∆ 0 2 -measurable, hence, in a sense, not very discontinuous. A similar counterexample is also exhibited in [39, Example 3] . Proof. Assume for a contradiction that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game. Then no subprofile (starting at some node in 0 * ) induces the outcome x, because Player b could then switch to the right and obtain z. So for infinitely many nodes in 0 * , Players a or b chooses 1. Also, if Player b chooses 1 at some node 0 2n+1 , Player a chooses 1 at the node 0 2n right above it. This implies that every subprofile rooted at nodes in 0 2 * induces the outcome y, and subsequently, Player b always chooses 0 at nodes in 0 2 * +1 . But then Player a could always choose 0 and obtain x, contradiction.
Conversely, consider a game with finitely many players and outcomes such that the pattern from Example 34 is absent from the preferences of any two players. If the outcome function is measurable in the Hausdorff difference hierarchy (of the open sets), [20, Corollary 2] says that the game has a Pareto-optimal subgame perfect equilibrium.
A further example shows us that we can rule out subgame perfect equilibria even with stronger conditions on the functions by using countably many distinct payoffs. This example no longer extends to ε-subgame perfect equilibria.
Example 35. The following game where y n := (2 −n , 2 −n ) and z n := (0, 2 −n−2 ) for all n ∈ N has no subgame perfect equilibrium, although the payoff functions are upper-semicontinuous. Proof. If the payoffs are (2, 0), Player b can improve her payoff as late as required, so there are infinitely many "right" choices in a subgame perfect equilibrium. If the payoffs are not (2, 0) then Player a chooses "right" at every node that she owns, so that Player b chooses "left", but then Player a chooses "left" too.
In [7] , an intricate counterexample is provided showing that subgame-perfect equilibria may even fail to exist for probabilistic strategies (in a two-player game with Borel measurable payoff functions).
Outlook
There is one open question regarding infinite sequential games with real-valued payoff functions (see the question mark in the Overview table on page 3), namely: Open Question 36. Do games with countably many players and upper-semicontinuous payoff functions have ε-subgame perfect equilibria?
It seems surprising to have both Nash equilibria and ε-subgame perfect equilibria, but no subgame perfect equilibria -but this is precisely the situation for finitely many players. On the other hand, given the split between finitely many players and countably many players for lower-semicontinuous payoff functions, one should be cautious about assuming that this result would extend. Thus, we do not present a conjecture regarding the answer to the open question.
The results in this paper are generally not constructive -but neither is Nash's theorem in [28] , cf. [31] . The extent of non-constructivity is investigated in [23, 22] .
The condition on the payoff functions used in Section 4 seems to merit further investigation. This was that for any sequence (p i ) i∈N converging to p in C ω , we find that ∀i ∈ N v(p i ) ≺ v(p i+1 ) implies ∀i ∈ N v(p i ) ≺ v(p). This is a weaker condition than continuity of the function where the upper order topology is used on the codomain, which still seems to be strong enough to formulate some results. In a sense, it is a weakening of continuity that is orthogonal to Borelmeasurability. As an example, a result by Gregoriades (reported in [33] ) shows that any function of this type from Baire space to the countable ordinals has to be bounded.
In settings inspired by verification, sequential games often take place on a finite graph rather than an infinite tree. In this case, rather than seeking Nash equilibria built from arbitrary strategies, it is desirable to obtain Nash equilibria built from strategies realizable by finite automata. The high-level ideas of this paper can be translated (with some effort) into this setting, as demonstrated by the authors in [24] .
